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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE A. SI~IS. :JI. IC SL\IS, 
ELl\fER L. SI~rs AND G. GRAN'r 
S I l\1 S , d /b I a SALT LAKE 
TRANSFER CO~IPA:NY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERYICE CO~I~IISSION 
0 F uTAH AXD l\I A G N A-
GARFIELD TRrCK LINE, a 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
CASE N 0. 7377 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
SrPPLE~IEXTAL STATE~IENT OF FACTS . 
The statement of facts contained in plaintiffs' brief 
fails to set forth certain eYidence vital to the rights in 
these proceedings of defendant ~lagna-Garfield Truck 
Line. It is, therefore, deemed necessary to supplement 
plaintiffs' statement of facts, in order to present to the 
Court the full force of th~ evidence received by the 
Public Service Commission, upon which it denied plain-
tiffs' application for a contract -carrier's permit. 
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The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line is a con-
solidated corporation organized and existing under and 
by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah, consisting of 
two former corporations organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah, known and designated as 
Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake & Bingham 
Freight Lines. The said defendant received its Certifi-
cate- of Incorporation from the Secretary of State of 
Utah on the 31st day of December, 1946. (R. 113, 114) 
Salt Lake & Bingham Freight Lines (being one of the 
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner 
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in 
intra-state commerce of the following Certificates of 
Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service 
Commission of Utah (R. 115): 
Certificate 
No. 
296 
658 
Date 
April21, 1927 
April 23, 1945 
Case 
No. 
963 
2833 
Said Magna-Garfield Truck Line (being also one of the 
consolidating corporations as aforesaid) was the owner 
and holder as a common motor carrier of property in 
intra-state commerce of the following Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity issued by the Public Service 
Commission of Utah (R. 114, 115): 
Certificate 
No. 
262 
Date 
l\f arch 6, 1946 
Case 
No. 
847 
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In a proc_'eding ir:stituted before tl:e P··blic Serv~cc 
Commission of Utah on the 5th day of February, 1947, 
by sa:d defendant company, in the matter of the applica-
tion of ~Iagna-Garfield Truck Line, a consolidated corpo-
ration of Magna-Garfield Truck Line and Salt Lake & 
Binghan1 Freight Lines, designated No. 3092, the said 
Commission, by order dated the 6th day of May, 1947 
(R. 113, 118) did cancel and annul Certificate of Conven-
ience and X ecessity X o. 262, issued to said :Magna-Gar-
field Truck Line (being one of the consolidating corpo-
rations) in Case Xo. 847, and Certificates of ConveniencP 
and X ecessity X os. 296 and 658 issued to Salt Lake & 
Bingham Freight Lines (being one of the consolidating 
corporations) in Cases X os. 963 and 2833, and in lieu 
thereof said Commission issued unto defendant company 
Certificate of Convenience and ~ecessity ~o. 771 (R.113) 
to operate as common .motor carrier for the transporta-
tion of commodities generally from Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to Garfield, Utah, over United States Highway X o. 91 to 
junction with Vnited States Highway ~ o. 50, thence 
over United States Highway X o. 50 and return over the 
same route, including all intermediate points and off-
route point of Bacchus, Utah; and from Salt Lake City, 
Utah, to \Vest Jordan, South Jordan, Riverton, Bluff-
dale, Herriman and Bingham, Utah, over United States 
Highway No. 91 and State and County roads and return, 
including all intermediate points, except that no service 
was authorized on United States Highway No. 91 between 
33rd South s·t. and Sandy, Utah, including Midvale, Utah. 
Acting under and by virtue of the authority con-
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tained in and incidental to said Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity No. 771 as aforesaid, defendant Magn_a-
Garfield Truck Line (the consolidated corporation) has 
continuously since the 6th day of May, 1947, operated 
as a common carrier for the transportation of commodi-
ties generally over and upon the aforesaid routes de-
~eribed in said Certificate of Convenience and "Necessity. 
(R. 140, 141, 142) 
The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line has in 
all respects and particulars complied with the terms, 
conditions and restrictions contained in said Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity (R. 140)· and in particular 
said defendant has maintained on file with the aforesaid 
Commission all insurance required by law, and all tariff~, 
containing complete information as to rates, rules, regu-
lations and schedules. (R. 140) Said defendant has 
operated as a common motor carrier of commodities 
over the aforesaid routes at all times in accordance with 
the statutes of the State of Utah and the rules and regula-
tions of the Public Service Commission of Utah existing 
on the date of said Certificate of Convenience and Nee-
essity, and which were thereafter prescribed by said 
Commission, governing the -operations of common motor 
carriers over the public highways of the State of Utah. 
(R. 140) 
For a long time prior to the granting of said Certifi~ 
eate of Convenience and Necessity No. 771, the two con-
solidating . corporations . aforesaid (predecessors of this 
defendant) bper~te·a O"~et the aforesaid routes described 
in the afores-aid Ce~i·tificate- of Conve-nience and Necessity, 
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·as eonuuon 1notor earriers of commodities g<'nt>rally, an. I 
rendered nnto ·the public rt-~hH)nably adequate and con-
tinuous ~erYiee a~ such earrier~. (R. 114, 115, 141) :--;aid 
defendant, as the consolidated corporation, has continued 
:'aid operation, and has fulfilled all requirements of la'". 
and all of the requiren1ents and regulations of the afore- . 
said Public ~erYicP Commission in the aforesaid opera,-
tions. (~. 140, 141) The said defendant has operated 
upon a regular schedule, averaging three truck move-
ments per day fron1 Salt Lake City to Bingham and 
Lark and return. (R. 142, 153) The said defendant 
company owns four trucks capable of handling five 
tons, or 10,000 pounds each, three trucks capable of han-
dling ten tons, or 20,000 pounds each, one pickup truck, 
and one ten-ton semi-trailer. (R. 142) It has twelve 
employees, six of whom are regularly employed as truck 
drivers. (R. 143, 155) Two of its shop men are also 
qualified truck drivers, and can be used in emergency 
to -drive trucks. (R. 155) Its trucks are capable of han-
dling 100,000 pounds of commodities per day. (R. 145) 
It is able to rent trucks for operations in excess of its 
normal operations or scheduled runs. (R. 145) All equip-
ment is in~'A-1 condition". (R. 144) 
The West Jordan plant of Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
pany is located about ten miles. south of Salt Lake City, 
on Redwood Road. _The factory itself stands about two 
or three blocks from the -highway. (R. 142) The defend-
. -
ant company operates its scheduled freight service over 
Redwood Road from Salt Lake City to Binp;lwr:1 and 
Lark. (R. 142) The defendant company has takeri- carr 
;) 
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of all requests made by the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company 
to move sugar from West Jordan to Salt Lake City, with 
one exception. (R. 144) This .·exception involved a tele-
phone call in the late afternoon, whereby the Sugar 
Company requested a truck at its West Jordan plant 
within one-half hour. The defendant company informed 
the Sugar Company that it would provide a truck within 
two hours, which still permitted the movement of the 
sugar into Salt Lake City the same day. (R. 144) This 
episode occurred during the peak season of sugar haul-
age in June. ( R. 144) The handling of sugar does not 
require any unusual or extraordinary equipment other 
than it must be of such nature as to keep the sugar dry. 
(R. 107, 146) The equipment of the defendant Magna-
Garfield Truck Line is of that nature, four trucks being 
closed trucks. (R. 146) Said defendant has handled both 
l. t.l. shipments and t.l. shipments, some of the shipments 
being from the Sugar Factory _to, towns served directly 
by said defendant. These shipmeritl3 were usually small-
5 to 10 bags each. ( R. 110, 146) Said defendant company 
has also moved some truckload- shipments from West 
Jordan to Security Warehouse in Salt Lake and to candy 
companies. (R. 147) These·ship~ents occurred only dur~ 
ing the peak season, which is the canning season. (R. 147) 
Said defendant is able to handle all peak sugar movements 
(R. 150) and if the movement of more than 1,000 bags a 
day is required, said defendant is in a position to buy 
more trucks or rent trucks to take care of the emergency. 
(R. 151) 
The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company offered no criticism 
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of the handling of its shipments by the defendant ('0111-
pany. nor did it make any criticism of its automotive 
equipn1ent. (R. 106) The service rendered it by defendant 
company has been very satisfactory. (R. 106) It sup-
ported plaintiffs' application for a contract carrier per-
mit because it desired speedy service rather than "emer-
g·ency" service. (R. 103, 107) The defendant company 
has never refused the Sugar Company con1mon carrie~· 
service. ( R. 103) 
The plaintiffs prior to the filing of their application 
for a contract carrier's permit in the. instant case had 
served Utah-Idaho Sugar Company under a ''purported 
oral agreement". (R. 70, 71, 73, 75, 92, 102) They 
rendered such service without any formal authority from 
the Public Service Commission. ( R. 84) 
The following colloquy between Mr. Donald Hacking, 
Chairman of the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
and l\Ir. Elmer L. Sims, a witness for the plaintiffs, is 
pertinent: 
''CoM. HACKING: As I understand your testi-
mony, you have rendered this service to the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company at West Jordan for some 
considerable period of time? 
A. Yes. 
CoM. HACKING: And are still rendering it. As 
you stated, you sent a truck out yesterday')? 
A. Yes. 
Co~r. HACKIXG: ~ow, under what claim of 
authority have you been rendering this service 
· since the effective day of the 1945 Amendment to 
the l\rotor Carrier Act, excluding from the exemp-
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tion the contract hauls fifteen miles beyond the 
city limits~ 
A. Well, I thought that we automatically had 
the right to continue doing the type of business 
we were prior to 1945; that if we were operating 
as a contract carrier permit prior to that time, we 
could continue to operate. 
CoM. HACKING: That is, you had the view that 
you would have that authority automatically, 
without any specific written authority from this 
Commission~ 
A. I thought we could continue it, see. 
CoM. HAcKING: Has the Commission, through 
its enforcement department, questioned that au-
thority and cheeked you on-:that ~ 
A. They have never questioned us on this 
\Yest .Jordan haul. I believe the Commission has 
known for quite a period of time, we were hauling 
this sugar. As a matter of fact, I filed a contract 
with you. No one seems to be able to find it, but, 
if I remember correctly, I filed the contract with 
the Commission almost a year ago. 
co~r. HACKING: Isn't it a fact, Elmer, that 
you have procured temporary authorities from 
time to time in some of these cases, where there 
has been a big movement of sugar, to make the 
haul J 
A. Yes sir, we have. From Ogden and Lehi. 
CoM. HACKING: Have yon ('\Ter from West 
Jordan~ 
A. I don't believe so. '' ( R. 84, 85) 
Also, the following part of the testimony of Mr. 
George A. Sims, a witness on behalf of plaintiffs, given 
on direct examination is extremely relevant: 
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''Q. Mr. Sims, this is an application relative 
to a contract carrier authority to operatP for and 
on behalf of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company be-
tween \Y est Jordan and Salt Lake City. Will 
you state how long you have engaged in that 
type of operation ~ 
.. .:\ .. 'Yell, we haYe been hauling for the Sugar 
Company back as far as I can remember, and 
that would be in '35, 1935. And we have produced 
eYidence at our hearing '"hen we applied for one 
rights, and the Commission said we were not only 
cornmon carriers for certain articles, but we were 
a contract carrier and we were given the rights 
to be a contract carrier at that time. 
Q. Directing your attention to the year 1940, 
were you, during 1940 and prior thereto, engaged 
as a contract carrier, by verbal contract, with the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company in transporting their 
commodities between West Jordan and Salt Lake? 
A. Yes; we made an agreement with them 
to haul-
MR. RITER: I am going to object to that ques-
tion, and I am doing it for the purpose of the 
record here. • * * 
CoM. HACKING: The objection will be over-
ruled. 
MR. PuGSLEY: You may answer. 
THE WITNESS: Repeat that question: 
(Question read.) 
A. Yes sir, and since that time. 
Q (By Mr. Pugsley). Since that time have 
you served them under this oral arrangement, 
from time to time~ 
A. Yes, whenever they needed us." (R. 65, 
66, 67) 
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Mr. George A. Sims also testified on cross-examina-
tion in part as follows:· -
·" Q. Well now, you used a clause here on a 
statement, that interested me very much, in testi-
fying as to your service to the Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company. You said, '\Vhenever they needed it'. 
As a matter of fact, your practice has been 
that when the Sugar Company called up you 
responded with one of your trucks, didn't you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
0. And you made your arrangement then and 
~there as to what the rate would be~ · 
A. They already had our price we \vere work-
ing for. 
Q. You had discussed the prices, what you 
were working for, previously~ 
A. Oh y<·~. 
Q. But so far as the immediate arrangement 
went, it was principally by telephone, I assume¥ 
A. After the first arrangement was made. 
with them, yes sir. 
Q. \V ell, what do you mean by 'an oral agree-
ment', then~ 
A. By an oral agreement is where you go 
see a firm, and they ask you what you would haul 
-how much a hundred pounds you would haul 
from a certain point to a certain point, based on 
a quantity of so much. 
-Q. Well, Mr. Sims, when you examined _the 
record in your case-you recall your case that 
made.a lot of htw for us, that went. to the Supreme 
Court~ 
10 
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A. Yes, it went to the Supre1ne Court twice. 
Q. Yes, it went to the Supreme Court twice, 
and when you examined the Public Service Com-
mission's record in that case, you recall-when. 
the permit as contract carrier was issued to you 
there was six different firms specified you would 
serve1 
A. Yes, sir, but I was given the impression 
that all that was necessary after we were given 
the rights of a contract carrier, all we would 
have to do was file another contract, and it would 
automatically go into effect. That was the under-
standing of why they gave us this as a contract 
carrier. 
Q. AU right. You could read the orders of the 
Commission in that respect, couldn't you 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you know that-what those orders 
specified, didn't you-in detail the Commission 
pursued that matter, and very carefully enumer-
ated the concerns for which you could carry as 
contract carrier~ 
MR. ruGSLEY: well, just one moment. I object 
to this as calling for a legal conclusion, and, fur-
ther, the fact that the Commission will take judi-
cial notice of the fact that this sugar factory is 
within the fifteen-mile zone which was exempt 
at the time this former order was issued. * 'X< * 
* * * ¥,: * 
CoM. HAcKING-: The objection will be over-
ruled. 
A. I thought I knew, but the thing has been 
twisted around now so I don't know where I am at. 
11 
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Q. Well, Mr. Sims, as a matter of fairnes8 
to you, would you like to see the copy of the 
amended order of the Commission on the 23rd 
of February, 1939, in Case 1849 ~ * * * 
A. It is case No. 1849. Yes, I have read it. 
Q. (By Mr. Riter) : You don't notice the 
name of the Utah-Idaho Sugar in there, ·do you~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Were you hauling for the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar at that time~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Do you want to go back there and read 
the whole opinion of the Commission on there, 
where they define the difference between the con-
tract carriers and common carriers~ 
A. I think I know. 
Q. You think you know that~ 
A. Right. 
Q. Then you recall what the Commission told 
you at that time was the exact difference between 
the two, and they defined it~ 
A. I think I could define it. 
Q. My point is this, after that extensive liti-
gation which you took to the Supreme Court 
twice, and after these elaborate proceedings be-
fore the Public Service Commission, all of which 
you were informed of because you paid for, of 
course-now I want to know why, in face of that, 
did you ignore this Utah-Idaho Sugar situation? 
.MR. PuGSLEY: I object to that, as no evidence 
in the record he has ignored the Utah-Idaho 
situation at all. 
12 
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iliR. RITER: Perhaps the best way right now 
1s to withdraw. 
I expected ~Ir. Pugsley would introduce into 
this hearing these basic proceedings that enter 
relevantly into any consideration of this. Are 
you going to introduce them in evidence~ 
:JIR. PeasLEY : I am not. 
:JIR. RITER: \Yill you take judicial notice of it~ 
CoM. HAcKING: Mr. Riter, is West Jordan 
within fifteen miles of Salt Lake City limits~ 
~IR. RITER : Yes, it is. 
:JIR. PuGSLEY : Yes sir. 
CoM. HACKING: Well, at that time the Salt 
Lake Transfer could have served West Jordan 
without any authority. 
:JIR. RITER: Under the old law. 
CoM. HACKING: Under the old law. 
:JIR. PuGSLEY: That's right. 
CoM. HAcKING: That is, at the time this report 
and order was made and issued by the Commis-
sion, there was no particular need to consider the 
"~est Jordan movement, was there~ 
:JlR. RITER: Except this, that this whole mat-
ter of their contract carrier status was being 
considered hy the Commission, and :Jlr. Sims has 
testified that at that time they were serving Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company, and what I want to know 
is why, in view of these plenary proceedings that 
were before this Commission ann before the 
Supreme Court, why at that time this Utah-Idaho 
Sugar situation wasn't brought to the attention 
of the Commission ~ 
CoM. HACKI~G: Can you answer that, :Mr. 
Sims~ 
13 
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A. Yes sir. The"re was a elause in the la·\\-
that we were operating under then that we had a 
right to take eare of interurban delivery of gen-
eral eommodities anywhere within a radius of 
fifteen miles of the eity limits, .and that wasn't 
only for one firm, but that was a State-wide 
exemption, so that a man living in the eountry 
eould deliver something over fifteen miles to a 
neighbor in town, and likewise, here, and we 
operated under that. I helped put the clause in." 
(R. 70-76) 
The plaintiffs are the owners -and holders of Certificate 
of Convenienee and Necessity No. 512 dated-January 19, 
1939. (R. 119, 135-) This Certificate permits them to tran~­
port in intra-state commerge commodjties which by rea-
son of their size, shape, weight, origin or destination 
require special equipment or service of a character not 
regularly furnished by common carriers at regular line 
rates; commodities in connection with the transportation 
of which is rendered a special service in preparing such 
comnwdities for shipment or setting up after delivery, 
or otherwise rendering a service not a part of ordinary 
act of transportation, and not regularly furnished by 
other common carriers; and camp site equipment . (R. 135, 
137) Plaintiffs are also the holders of contract carrier 
permit No. 212 (amended) dated February 23, 193~, 
issued in Case No. 1849 (R. 73, 125, 126, 132) wherein 
the plaintiffs are authorized to transport certain speci-
fied property for six identified contractees (none of whom. 
was the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company) over several separ-
ate routes in the State of Utah. (R. 73, 75) 
14 
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~\.RGU~lE~T 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED 
AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO A CONTRACT 
CARRIER PERMIT UNDER THE SO-CALLED 
"GRANDFATHER" RIGHT AS PROVIDED BY 
SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 1943, AS AMEND-
ED BY LAWS OF UTAH 1945, CHAPTER 105, 
SECTION 3, PAGE 209. 
Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by Laws 
of Utah, 19-±5, Chapter 105, Section 3, Page 209, was 
operative on the date of the application of plaintiffs for 
a contract carrier permit. The present statute reads a::; 
follows: 
76-5-21. 
''It shall be unlawful for any contract motor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate com-
merce ·without having first obtained fron1 the 
commission a permit therefor. The Commission 
shall grant on application to any applicant who 
was a contract motor carrier as defined by this 
act on the 1st day of January, 1940, a permit to 
operate as a contract motor carrier on the same 
highways and to carry on the same type of motor 
service as he was on said date. 
"The commission upon the filing of an appli-
cation for a qontract motor carrier's permit shall 
fix a time and place for hearing thereon and may 
give the same noticelas provided in section 76-5-18 
hereof. If, from all the testimony offered at said 
hearing, the commission shall determine that the 
highways over which the applicant desires to 
operate are not unduly burdened; that the grant-
ing of the application will npt unduly interfere 
with the traveling public; and that the granting 
15 
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of the application will not be detrimental to the 
best interests of the people of the state of Utah 
and/ or to the localities to be served, and if the 
existing transportation facilities do not provide 
adequate or reasonable service, the commission 
shall grant such permit." 
The plaintiffs assign as error the action of the Com-
mission in refu~ing to grant plaintiffs a contract carrier 
permit to haul sugar _between West Jordan and Salt Lake 
City, Utah, f.or the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company. Funda-
mentally, this claim_ of error is based upon the purported 
"grandfather" clause contained in the above quoted 
statute, and reading as follows: 
''The commission shall grant on application 
to any .applicant \vho was a contract motor carrier 
as defined by this act on the 1st day of January, 
1940,. a permit to operate as a contract motor car-
rier on the same highways and to carry on the 
same type of motor service as he was on said 
date." 
According to plaintiffs' contention, this permit should 
have issued to the plaintiffs as a matter of right upon 
their showing that on the 1st day of January, 1940, they 
were operating as a contract carrier for the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company on the public highway between West 
Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The imm.ediate antecedent of the present :statute is 
Section 9 of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, which reads 
in pertinent part as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any contract motor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in trastate com-
merce without having first obtained from the com-
16 
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Inission a perinit therefol·. The commission shall 
grant on application to any applicant who was :.1 
contract n1otor carrier as defined by this act on 
the fifteenth day of .March, 1933, a permit to 
operate as a contract nwtor carrier on the sanw 
highways and to carry on the same type of motor 
serYice as he was prior to said date. Where said 
applicants were operating· on all the highways 
of the state prior to said date, the permit shall 
authorize them to continue to operate on all of 
said highways. The commission shall further-
more grant on application to any applicant who 
received a permit to operate as a contract motor 
carrier between the fifteenth day of March, 1933, 
and the date on which this act takes effect, a 
permit to continue to operate in the same manner 
and over the same highways as the terms of said 
permit allowed. 
"The commission upon the filing of an applica-
tion for a contract motor carrier's permit by any 
other person than those referred to above in this 
section shall fix a time and place for hearing there-
on and shall give the same notice as provided in 
section 6 hereof. * * * If, from all the testimony 
offered at said hearing, the commission shall 
determine that the highways over which the appli-
cant desires to operate are not unduly burdened: 
that the granting of the application will not unduly 
interfere with the traveling public; and that the 
granting of the application will not be detrimental 
to the best interests of the people of the state 
of Utah and/or to the localities to be served, the 
commission shall grant such permit; * " * '' 
(Italics supplied) 
A comparison of the law under which plaintiffs made 
their application on November 10, 1947, with the relevant 
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provi~ions of the 1935 statute last above quoted, clearly 
sh.ows that the Legislature, in providing for the "grand-
father'' rights, intended to rnodify in a radical manner 
the provisions of the prior law. In order to understand 
this change, it is necessary to refer to the case of Mc-
Ca·rthy v .. Public Service Commission of Utah, 94 Ut. 
304, 77 Pac. 2d 331. This decision, in interpreting Sec-
tion 9 of Chapter G5, Laws of Utah, 1935, took note of 
the fact that the statute made no provision for notice 
and hearing in the granting of contract carrier permits 
under the ''grandfather'' clause, but that the application 
for such permit by any other contract motor carrier, viz. 
new-comers in the contract motor business, should be 
set for hearing at a time and place fixed by the Com-
mission, and notice be given to all adversely interested 
in the same. The ''grandfather'' clause of this statute 
favored two classes: (a) those who were contract car-
riers as defined by the act on March 15, 1933, and (b) 
those "~ho received a permit as contract carrier after 
~larch 15, 1933 and before the effective date of Chapter 
65 (December 31, 1935). The Court, however, specifically 
declined to accept the literal reading of the statute, 
using this language : 
''But it was never intended by the ·Legislature 
that these permits issued under the act to existing 
or antecedent contract· carriers without a hearing 
or: ilcrtfce :to. others, should be conclusive and bind-
ing determinations of the right of such permittees 
to operate thereunder, or to perform any other or 
different service than specified therein or e.ven the 
class of service therein stated. In the nature of 
the case, such permits can only operate as prima 
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facie eYidenre of the right of the permitteP to 
operate thereunder. Len~t of all, can it be proper-
ly ~aid that such a permit, issued upon applica-
tion, exclude~ the right of a competitor to contend 
and to show to the Conunission by protest, objec-
tion, or otherwise that the permittee in his opera-
tions thereunder has exceeded the limits or 
character of serTice pern1itted thereby, and has 
entered into regular competition with-let us say 
-con1mon motor carriers; that the permittee is 
holding himself out to the public as equipped, 
ready, and willing to accept loads wherever and by 
whomsoever tendered; or that he has provided 
himself with equipment for use in hauling loads 
that unduly injure the highway, the public, and all 
competitors; or that he is hauling regularly over 
highways not specified in his permit. These and 
many like subjects of inquiry might be suggested. 
In any such case it would be the Commission's 
duty to receive and file the complaints or objec-
tions made and to order a hearing to determine 
the truth of the matter, notwithstanding that a 
permit had already issued to the contract carrier 
in question. This is not unfair to the latter, 
for, had the permittee desired a permit or a 
certificate of necessity that would be conclusive 
and binding upon all comers, he had it in his 
power to request a hearing of the Commission 
and notice to all adversely concerned before the 
issuance or acceptance of the permit. Upon con-
stitutional principles the applicant cannot expect 
a conclusive or binding determination upon an 
ex parte application. Least of all, can he expect 
that persons adversely affected by his application 
shall be held bound or affected by mere self-
serving declarations or statements contained in 
his application for a permit." (pp. 336-337 of 
77 Pac. 2d) 
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As the McCarthy case, supra, points out, a distinc-
tion was made by the statute between applicants coming 
und<:>r the "grandfather" clause and those who applied 
for a permit who were not within the preferred classes. 
PlaintiffH' argument would find weight had the 1935 
statute been in operation at the time their application 
with which the Court is novv concerned was filed. 
\Vhen reference is made to Section 76-5-21 Utah 
(jode 1943, as amended by Laws of Utah 1945, it will be 
seen that the Legislature radically· changed the practice 
in t~is regard. The statute, after providing that a con-
tract motor carrier on the first day ·of January, 1940, 
should be granted a permit, directs: 
"The Commission upon the filing of .an applL-
cation for a contract motor carrier's permit shall 
fix a .time and place for hearing thereon and may 
give the same notice as provided in Section 
76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony offered 
at said hearing, the commission shall determine 
that the highways over which the applicant desires 
to operate are not unduly burdened; that the 
,granting of the applic~,t~on will not unduly inter-
fere with the traveling public; and that the grant-
ing of the application will not be detri:rp.ental to 
the best interests of the people of the state of 
Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and 
if the.existing transportation facilities do not pro-
vide adequate or reasonable service, the com-
mission shall grant' such permit. '' 
Compare the correlative provisions of Chapter 65, Laws 
of Utah 1935, whieh read: 
''The commission, upon the filing of an appli-
cation for a contract moto;r carrier's permit by 
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any other person than those referred to above, 
etc.," (Italics supplied) 
with the provisions of Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, 
as amended by the La"·s of Utah of 1945, and it will he 
thus seen that in the 19-15 act the legislature purposely 
eliminated the phrase "by aJl.IJ other person than those 
referred to above in this section," and added the words 
··and if the existing transportation facilities do not pro-
vide adequate or reasonable service,'' This change. in 
phraseology clearly expresses an intent on the part of 
the legislature that the practice of granting "grand-
father'' permits ''·'ithout notice would thereafter be elimi-
nated, and that all applications, whether under the 
''grandfather'' preference or without the preference, 
should be set for hearing, and notice thereof should be 
given to interested parties. The McCarthy decision, 
supra, was announced on March 12, 1938. It undoubtedly 
influenced the form of the 1945 amendment. 
It is manifest that the Court is now required to con-
strue Section 76-5-21 Utah Code 1943, as amended by 
Laws of Utah 1945, inasmuch as there exists on the face 
of the statute an apparent contradiction. By the first 
paragraph, the Commission is directed to grant on ap-
plication to any applicant who was a contract motor 
carrier as defined by the act on January 1, 1940, a per-
mit to operate as a contract motor carrier on the same 
highways and to carry on the same type of motor service 
as he was on said date. By the second paragraph of 
said section, the Commission is directed upon the filing 
of an application for a contract motor ~arrier's permit 
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to fix a tinw <Jnd place of hearing thereon, and to give 
notiee thereof. It may use the method of notice provided 
in Section /()_;)_18 Utah Code 1943. However, notice in 
some form must lw gi,Ten. It is then provided that if the 
Commission shall det<-'rmine "from all 'the testimony of-
fPrPd at said hearing" that four enumerated conditions 
are shown to exist, that a permit shall issue. A literal 
reading of this statute· produces confusion and contra-
diction. The section, after directing that an applicant who 
was a contract motor carrier on January 1, 1940, shall re-
ceive a permit to operate as such motor carrier, then pro-
vides that the Commission shall hold a hearing after 
notice, and receive evidence, and if such evidence meets 
the conditions named, it shall grant a permit. If the con-
struction is adopted such as the literal reading of the stat-
ute suggests, then the ''grandfather'' clause is wholly 
destroyed. It is not believed that such construction or 
interpretation of the statute would carry out the legisla-
tive intent. Therefore, the task· devolves upon the Court 
to discover, if pos~ible, a construction of the'statute which 
will give full weight to all its parts, eliminate absurdities, 
and at the same time express the legislative intent. 
The following rules for statutory construction are 
applicable: 
"In the interpretation of a statute,. the legi':i-
lature will be presumed to have inserted every 
part thereof for a purpose, and to have intended 
that every part of a statute should be carrie,l 
into effect. The maxim, 'ut ies magis, quam 
pereat,' requir.es not merely that a statute should 
. be given effect as a whole, but that effed shoulcl 
be given to eaC'h of its express·· ·p::r~·ovisions. A 
Q::? 
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statute should not be ronstnll'tl in such nmnn(•r 
as to render it partly ineffeeti,·p or inefficient if 
another construction will 1nake it effective. In-
deed, it is a cardinal rulP of statutory construction 
that i:lignifieanet> and effect should, if possiblP, 
without destroying the sense or effect of the law, 
be accorded every part of the act, including every 
section, paragraph, sentence, ~lause, phrase, an(l 
word. Under this rule, that construction is 
favored 'vhich will render every word operative, 
rather than one which makes some words idle 
and nugatory. Sometimes, however, it is not 
possible, in arriving .at the meaning of statutes, 
to give force and effect to every word and phra~e 
used. The court may not, in order to give effect 
to particular words, virtually destroy the mean-
ing of the entire context, that is, give them :1 
significance which would be clearly repugnant to 
the statute looked at as a whole and destructive 
of its obvious intent. It has also been declared 
that if a word is used unnecessarily in one part 
of a statute, it may well be regarded as so used 
in another.'' (50 Am. Jur., Sec. 358, pp. 361-3fj4.) 
"It is a general rule of interpretation that 
statutes should, if possible, be so construed as to 
make them practicable. Hence, a construction of 
an ambiguous statute should be avoided, which 
would render the application of the statute inl-
practicable, or which would require the perform-
ance of a vain, idle, or futile thing, or attempt to 
require the performance of an impossible act. 
Indeed, a statute will not be construed so as to 
require the performance of an impossible act, if 
any other construction can be legitimately given 
it. There are some statutes, however, the utility 
of which may not be considered. The courts can 
only interpret a statute as framed, notwithstand-
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ing difficulties in its application .. " (50 Am. Jur., 
Sec. 36'0, p. 365,) 
''Consistency in statutes is of prime impor-
tance,- and in the absence of a showing to the 
contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent 
with each other. Where it is possible ·to do so, 
it is the duty of the courts, in the construction 
of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile laws, and 
to adopt that construction of a statutory provision 
which harmonizes and reconciles it with other 
statutory provisions. A construction of a statute 
,\·hich creates an inconsistency should be avoided 
when a reasonable interpretation can be adopted 
which will not do violence to the plain words of 
the act and will carry out the intention of Con-
gress. *- ,y,, * In order that effect may be given 
to every part of an act in accordance with the 
legislative intent, all the language of the act 
must be brought into accord. The various provi-
sions of an act should be read so that all may, 
if possible, have their due and conjoint effect 
without repugnanc~- or inconsistency, so as to 
render the statute a consistent and harmonious 
whole. - Hence, where two constructions of a 
st·atute are possible, by one of which the entire 
act may be harmonious while the ather will 
.create discord between different provisions, the 
former should be adopted; ·Although the courts' 
cannot add to, take from, or change the· language 
of a· statute to give effect to any supposed inten-
tion. of the legislature; words .. and ·phrases may 
·be altered-. and supplied when that is necessary 
to obviate repugnancy and inconsistency and to 
-give effect to the manifest intention of the legis-
lature.- The legislative i,ntention will prevail over 
the literal import of particular terms, and will 
control the strict letter of the statute, where au 
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adhereueL' to such ~triet letter would lead to 
contradictory provisions. * * * '' (50 Am. Jur., 
Sec. 363, pp. 36'7-369.) 
• • Particular statutory provisions may present 
such an inconsistency as cannot be har1nonized 
·or reconciled. It is obvious that effect cannot 
be given to all the provisions of a statute where 
some of then1 are inconsistent and irreconcilable. 
In such case, as in other cases, a construction is 
sought w·hich would give effect to the purpose of 
the statute and the intention of the legislature. 
* * * " (50 Am. Jur., Sec. ·364, pp. 369-370.) 
c. It is a cardinal rule of construction that 
significance and effect shall, if possible. be ac-
corded to every section, clause, word or· part of 
the act." {2.5 R.C.L. 1004.) 
•' The several provisions of the statute should 
be construed together in the light·~ of the general 
purpose and object of. the. act and so as to give 
effect to the main intent and purpose of the 
legislature as therein expressed.'' ( 25 R.C.L. 
1007.) . 
''An interpretation which defeats ·any of the 
manifest purposes of the statute cannot be ac-
cepted." (2.5 R.C.L. 10J.4.) .. "·····'· 
U sin.g these well _e~tabli~_~ed rli~es of cO,·nstruction 
_as a basis for determining the legislative intent in ame:Qd-
_ing in 194~-, Section 76-5~2~~=utah c~d.e t94~ ·t~\ts. ·p~~Se!lt 
form, it is seen that the legislature had'in mind :the deci-
- ··-· --. 
sion of the Supreme Court in the· .. McCa'rthy· ca:~e ·supra, 
and that it intended to codify the rlil~ of that case by re-
quiring that' all applications for contract ~-a~ri~~'s:permits 
should be granted on_ly after hearing, whereof notic~ had 
been given. This purpose is clearly shown. by the elimi-
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nation of the phrase ''by any ·other person than those 
referred to above in this section", which was contained 
in the 1935 act (Sec. 9, Chapt. 65, Laws of Utah 1935 ). 
As to practice and procedure, the legislature made no 
distinction between those entitled to permits under the 
"grandfather" clause and late comers, but required in 
all cases that the permit be granted only after hearing 
upon notice. With this purpose definitely ascertained, 
the task remains to discover a construction which will 
maintain the integrity of this legislative purpose, and 
at the same time reconcile the "grandfather" clause 
with the second paragraph of the section. In this connec-
tion, the excerpt from the M cO arthy opinion above 
quoted is pertinent, and particularly the statement: 
''In the nature of the case, such permits 
[meaning permits issued without notice or hear-
ing] can only operate as prima facie evidence of 
the right of the permittee to operate thereunder. 
Least of all, can it be properly said that such a 
perrp.it, issued upon application, excludes the 
right of a competitor to contend and to show to 
the Commission * * * that the permittee in his 
operations * * * has entered into regular competi-
tion with-let us say-common motor carriers 
* * * '' (Italics supplied) 
That declaration suggests strongly a construction and 
interpretation of the statute which will attain the main 
objective of the legislature and at the same time make 
effective all provisions of the statute. It is believed, and 
it is hereby earnestly urged, that a reasonable meaning 
of the statute may be deduced as follows: 
(a) That all applications for a contract carrier's 
carrier's permit, whether by pr.eferred persons 
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under the "gnindfather" clause or by latt.• 
come.·s into the transportation field, must be 
set for hearing· upon a date certain, and notice 
of the hearing be given: 
(b) That no contract carrier's permit shall issue 
until after a hearing in which persons adv:ersely 
affected may appear and submit evidence on 
their behalf, and cross-ex:amine opposing wit-
nesses: 
(c) In the event there is a "full dress" hearing held 
after interested parties have appeared in oppo-
sition, the Commission must, from the evidence, 
find the four conditions existing as set forth 
in the second paragraph of the statute before 
a permit may issue; 
(d) In determining the existence of such conditions, 
proof that the applicant is a preferred person 
under the "grandfather" clause will prima facie 
establish his right to a permit, and cast the 
burden of going forward with the proof upon 
his opponents to disestablish this prim:a facie 
right, the burden of proof remaining, however, 
in toto upon the applicant to establish the four 
conditions named in the statute. 
(e) If after the Commission has set the application 
for hearing upon a date certain and has given 
notice, no interested persons appear in opposi-
tion to the granting of the permit, proof that 
the applicant is a preferred p·erson under the 
"grandfather" clause will entitle him to a permit. 
Under the foregoing construction, the "grandfather" 
clause, in ·dew of the 1945 amendment, does not confer 
upon an applicant a substantive right, but rather a pro-
cedural advantage. This procedural advantage is not a 
mere shadow or chimera, but is a process of \'alue to an 
applicant in seeking a permit. It is an adyantage well 
known to legal prqcedun-'.* 
*As an example', Section 80-12-4 Utah Code 1943 provides tha~ 
a transfer of a material part of a decedent's estate in the nature of 
a final distribution thereof, made by a decedent within three ye~r~ 
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It is earnestly contended by the defendants that the 
foregoing construction and interpretation of this stat-
ute complies with recognized rules of statutory con-
struction; perpetuates the intention of the legislature; 
does no violence to the rights of the parties interested, 
but rather preserves the same and recognizes due procE~-ss 
procedure, so strongly implied in the McCarthy decision, 
supra. 
A review of the record in this case reveals that the 
Commission recognized both the rule of the McCart/I:!J 
decision and the mandates of the 1945 act. The plain .. 
tiffs' application was set for hearing upon a date cer-
tain, and all interested persons notified. The defendant 
carrier appeared in response to said notice, and con-
tested the application. The plaintiff primarily rested 
its case (mistakenly, we believe) upon its "grandfather" 
rights, a'S it does in these review proceedings. Substan-
tial evidence was submitted which enabled the Commis-
sion to make definite findings: (·a) that the applicant 
had f-ailed to show that existing transportation f~acilities 
did not provide adequate or reasonable service, as re-
quired by Section 76-5-21, as amended; (b) that tht! 
granting of the permit would detract from the business 
of the existing carriers, which would eventually impair 
rather than improve transportation service in the area 
proposed to be served; (c) that the defendant carrier 
is ready, able, and willing to render reasonable, adequatn 
prior to his death, except a bona fide sale for a fair consideration, 
"shall be presumed to have been made in contemplation of death." 
Any lawyer is well aware of the difficulties of overcoming this 
presumption or prima facie case in opposition to the tax authorities' 
purpose to tax such transfer. 
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H'l'Yl<:l:' tn the area and the ~hippPr eoYPI'l'd by tlw ap-
plication: (d) that ~nffieient ~ervieP i~ nln·a<ly nYailnl>lu 
in the area propo~Pd to be ~erYed- by thP applieant; and 
•, e) that the g-ranting of the application would be dd ri-
mental to the be~t interP~t~ of tlw people in the area 
covered by the application. 
In view of the foregoing, it i~ submitted that plain-
tiff~' contention that it wa~ auto1natieally entitled to u 
contract carrier\~ pennit in the instant case by virtue 
of preferred rights conferred upon it by the ''grand-
father'' clause, is without merit. 
II. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE-
BENEFIT OF THE "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS 
UNDER SECTION 76-5-21, UTAH CODE 1943, AS 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 105, LAWS OF UTAH 
1945, BECAUSE (1) THEY WERE NOT A CON-
TRACT CARRIER ON JANUARY 1, 1940 AND 
(2) THEY ILLEGALLY TRANSPORTED SUGAR 
OVER PUBLIC HIGHWWAYS FOR UTAH-IDAHO 
SUGAR COMPANY FROM WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
TO SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, DURING THE 
PERIOD FROM MAY 8, 1945, TO THE DATE O:F 
HEARING BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION IN THIS MATTER. 
E,Ten though plaintiffs' construction of Section 76-
;}-:21, l~tah Code 1943, as amended by Chapter 105, Law:-: 
of r tah 1945, . be adopted, the evidence in this ca..;p 
pron·~ that they were operating on January 1, 1940 
under the '' 15 mile'' exemption and also that they haJ 
forfeited their right to claim pri,Tileges under the 
• 'grandfather'' clause of the statute. The testimony 
of Oeorge ~l. Sims and Elmer A. Sims, witnesses 
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on behalf of plaintiffs at the hearing before the 
·Commission, hereinbefore set forth in the defendant 
carrier's supplemental statement of facts, abundantly 
demonstrates that the plaintiffs transported sugar for 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company upon the public high-
ways of Utah between the West Jordan plant of the 
Sugar Company and Salt Lake City, Utah, during the 
period commencing :May 8, 1945 and up to the date o:f 
hearing before the Commission. Their testimony also 
shows without contradiction that the plaintiffs did not 
secure from the Commission a contract carrier's permit 
to cover this transportation. 
Chapter 105, Laws of Utah 1945, also amended Sec-
tion 76-5-25 Utah Code 1943 by striking therefrom these 
two exemptions from the operation of the Motor Carriers 
Act: 
(a) ''To contract motor carriers of property 
when operating wholly within the limits of an in-
corporated city or town and for a distance of not 
exceeding fifteen road miles beyond the corporate 
limits of the city or town in Utah in which the 
point of origin of any property or passenger 
movement is located or when operated within a 
radius of 15 miles from any point of origin out-
side of an incorporated city or town in Utah, and 
which movement either alone or in conjunction 
with another vehicle or vehicles is not a part of 
any journey or haul beyond said fifteen-mile 
limit;" 
(i) "To the casual or occasional transportation 
of persons or property for compensation by any 
person not regularly engaged in transportation 
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by nwtor Yehieles a~ his or its principal oceu-
pn tion or busine~8. · · 
The legal re:3ult of the repeal of the "15 mile" exemp-
tion forn1erly contained in the 1935 act (Section 76-5-25 
Utah Code 1943) is described by ~Ir. Justice Latimer in 
the prevailing opinion in RaiCley v. Ptl!blic Service Corn-
mission of etah, ______ Utah _______ , 185 Pac. (2d) 514, at 5H) 
as follows: 
"The effect of these latter amendments was 
to bring under the control of the commission all 
carriers operating within cities and towns and 
for a distance of. not to exceed 15 miles beyond 
the corporate limits, and also to the casual or 
occasional operator who was operating but whose 
principal busines~ "-as not transportation.'' 
When Comn1issioner Hacking interr.ogated both Mr. 
Elmer L. Sims and :Jlr. George A. Sirns, witnesses for 
p}aintiffs, ·he particularly directed. his questions as to 
the plaintiffs' conduct of· their business after the effec-
tive date (~Iay 8, 1945) of Chapter 105 Laws of Utah 
1945,. amending Sections 76-5 .. 21 and 76-5-25 Utah Code 
1943. Both of these witnesses gave responses that indi-
cated definitely that the plaintiffs: had been using the 
public highways for transpo:r;tation of sugar for the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company during said period without 
securing any contract carrier'~ permit therefor. ~Ir_. 
George A. Sims' testimony further indicates. that. the 
plaintiffs had prior to May 8, 1945,. hauled the suga_r 
under the '' 15 mile'' exemption contained in _sub~ para-
graph (a) of Section 76-5-25 Utah Code 1943 before it 
was eliminated by the 1945. amend1nent. There is abso--
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lutely no evidence in the record that on January 1, 1940, 
or at any other time, the plaintiffs had obtained a con-
tract carrier's permit to handle sugar for the Utah-
Idaho Sugar Company. Conversely, the evidence shows 
without contradiction that the plaintiffs transported 
this sugar under the "15 mile" exemption, and that 
when that exemption was repealed on May 8, 1945, they 
did not make any effort to secure a contract carrier's 
permit. Rather, they continued operations without auth-
ority, and speciously explained such conduct at the 
hearing by stating they believed they had authority 
automatically to continue such service without specific 
written authority from the Commission. (R. 84) 
The evidence shows that plaintiffs were the holders 
of Contract Carrier Permit No. 212, as amended, dated 
February 23, 1939, issued in Case No. 1849 (R. 73, 125, 
126, 132) wherein the plaintiffs were authorized to trans-
port certain specific property for six identified con-
tractees (none of which was the Utah-Idaho Sugar Com-
• pany) over several separate routes in the State of Utah. 
(R. 73, 75) There is no evidence that the plaintiffs were 
ever granted a ''general contract carrier permit'' such 
as suggested by Mr. Justice "\Volfe in his concurring 
opinion in the McCarthy case, supra. (P. 22·6 of 184 
Pac. 2d) The evidence in fact shows that the plaintiff~ 
had been granted permits covering services to be ren-
dered to six contractees over defined routes, none of 
which wa.s the West Jordan-Salt Lake City route. Prior 
to the 1945 amendment, the plaintiffs had operated under 
the '' 15 mile'' exemption, but upon the removal of this 
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exemption fron1 thP -la\\', the plaintiffs automatically 
carne under the control of the Comission, and it wa~ 
their duty to apply at once to the Commi~~ion t'or a 
eontract carrier'~ pern1it eoYering the tran~portation 
of sl!gar for the Ptah.:.Idaho Sugar Con1pany. r:Cht> fail-
ure o'r refusal of plaintiff~ to secure this permit made· 
their transportation of ~ngar over publie highwa)·s a11 
illegal operation, and brings it squarely \dthin the rule 
of the Rou·ley ease. 
Section 76-5-:21 Utah Code 1943, as amended hy 
Chapter 105 Law8 of Utah 19-!5. denounc~s as unlawt\11 
the act of any contract n1otor carrier in operating as 
such carrier in intrastate connnerce without first having 
obtained from the Comrnission a permit therefor. After 
the repeal of the · '15 mile'' exemption on ::\lay 8, 1945, 
the plaintiffs in transporting sugar for Utah-Idaho 
s.ugar Company were as guilty of violating the law as 
Rowley had been. They had no right to use the public 
highways of Utah for such purpose. The fallacy of 
plaintiffs' position -is demonstrated by this simple fac-
tual statement: 
(a) Since repeal of the "15 mile" exemption, plain-
tiffs' transportation of sugar from vVest Jordan to Salt 
Lake City could not rest upon the '' 15 mile'' exemption. 
It was gone. 
(b) Plaintiffs at no time held a general contract 
carrier's permit (assuming suchtype of permit is author-
ized by law), but its contract carrier's permits covered 
contractees other than the Sugar Company and specific-
ally covered other routes. 
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(c) The plaintiffs at no time obtained a contract 
carrier's permit for their sugar hauling operations. 
The plaintiffs continued their illegal operations 
even after they filed their application for the permit now 
involved. Note the following exchange between Commis-
sioner Hacking and the witness Elmer L. Sims: 
''CoMMISSIONER HACKING: As I understand 
your testimony, you have rendered this service 
• to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company at West Jordan 
for some considerable period of time~ 
A. Yes. 
CoM. HACKING: And are still rendering it. 
As you stated, you sent a truck out yesterday t 
A. Yes." (R. 84) 
There is a suggestion in the testimony of plaintiffs' 
witnesses that they had filed with the Commission a con-
tract with the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company other than 
the contract now involved in this action. (R. 71, 85) The 
contention of plaintiffs (R. 71, 85) that the mere filing 
of the other contract (if one existed; it was never found) 
with the Commission was a sufficient compliance with 
the law, is a ridiculous conception. The mere filing of a 
contr~act with the Commission is certainly not obtaining 
a permit. 
With respect to sugar hauling opeartions for the 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, the plaintiffs were not in 
a position to claim the benefits of the "grandfather" 
clause, either as a substantive or as a procedural right. 
First, because on January 1, 1940 they transported sugar 
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unrler thP · ·1;) mih•'' exl•mption. At thP lH•aring tlwy 
rt>peaterlly made this claim. Thi:-: operation certain]~· 
wa~ not a contrart em-rier operation. Second, they had 
been E>ngagPd ::'incE' ~lay ~. l~).f;) in an illegal opPra-
tion, and under the dortrine of thP Rowley ca~<· 
should be dE>nied the right to as~Prt the privileges of th,• 
• • grandfather" clan~t>. The Conunission committed no 
error in itB failure to make a finding regarding the 
;::;tatus of plaintiffs as a contract nwtor carrier on Jan n-
ary -1, 1940. The absence of any such finding from the 
re~:<:n·d is 'yholly jristifie(} because plaintiffs on January 
1, 1940 operated under the "15 mile" exemption and 
al~o because-of plaintiffs' illegal use of public highways 
of the_ State of Utah subsequent to May 8, 1945. 
III. 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICA-
TION FOR A CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT 
WAS NOT AN ARBITRARY ACT OF THE COM-
:MISSION, BUT WAS BASED UPON SUBSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE WHICH NEGATIVED PLAIN-
TIFFS' RIGHT TO SUCH PERMIT. 
Plaintiffs have arg-ued in this litigation that even 
if their purported or alleged rights under the ''grand-
father" clause are eliminated from consideration, they 
submitted to the Commission substantial evidence which 
entitled them to a contract carrier's permit. This is 
but another way of asserting that the Findings of the · 
Commission are not supported by substantial evidence 
anrl that its denial of the application was capriciQus and 
arbitrary, and therefore constituted error of which the 
Supreme Court may take . cognizance in these· proceecl-
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ings. With respect to the Supreme Court's authority on 
this aspect of the case, the following quotation from 
Goodrich vs. Public Service Commission et al, (----. Ut. 
------, 198 Pac. 2d 975) is pertinent: 
"We have repeatedly held that in reviewing 
cases certified to this court from the Public Serv-
ice Commission on a statement of error that the 
Commission's report, findings, conclusions and 
order are unlawful, we are limited in our review 
to ascertaining whether or not the Commission 
had before it substantial evidence upon which to 
base its decision. Only in the event that we find 
the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or 
unreasonably in denying applicant's petition can 
we set aside the order.'' 
It was the obligation of the plaintiffs to demon-
strate to the Commission by competent evidence that: 
(a) the highway over which the applicant desired to 
operate was not unduly burdened; (b) the granting of 
the application would not unduly interfere with the 
traveling public; (c) the granting of the application 
would not be detrimental to the best interests of the 
public of the State of Utah and/or to the localities 
served; and (d) the existing_ transportation facilities do 
not provide adequate or reasonable service (See. 76-5-21 
Utah Code 1943, as amended by Chapter 105 Laws of 
Utah 1945). The burden was upon the plaintiffs to estab-
lish these conditions.· 
However, the defendants will assume in their argu-
ment on this aspect of the case (without waiving their 
contention that the plaintiffs are not entitled to ''grand-
father rights'') that the plaintiffs in this application 
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\\ t>n" a contract nu)tor L'arriL'l' ou January 1, 1~40, and 
were en tiled prima faeie to a contract ea rric•r '~ permit 
under the construction of the statute hereinbefore sub-
mitted under point I of this brief. This proble1n is there-
fore approached with the assumption that the plaintiffs, 
\Yithout submitting any further PYidence than their con-
tract c.arrier status on January 1, 1940, "made their 
case'' and cast the burden on the defendant carrier of 
going forward "Tith the evidence to disestablish this 
prima facie right to a permit. This is a radical con-
eession in plaintiffs' favor, but the defendant carrier 
makes this hypothetical concession in the full faith and 
belief that the evidence submitted by it plus the admis-
~ions of .Jir. H. \Y. Ansell, a witness on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, fully supports the Findings of the Commis-
~ir>'n. .Jlr. Ansell was the General Traffic ~Ianager of 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, and the Sug,ar Com-
pany \\~ould be the direct beneficiar:T of any contract 
carrier's permit granted plaintiffs. (R. 87) In this con-
nection, ~Ir. Ansell's admission upon cross examination 
i~ most pertinent: 
'' Q. Do I understand you only call on Salt Lake 
Transfer in these emergencies~ 
A. In general, yes. It might be times when 
our office is rushed, and rather than calling 
:Magna-Garfield and then waiting for a while to 
see whether they can do it or not, they just want 
to satisfy that man, and they call the Salt Lake 
Tran~fer Company. 
Q. As a matter of fact, it is a continuous 
practice, isn't it, ~f r. Ansell, emergenry or no 
Pmergency j? 
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A. No, I don't think so. I wouldn't say that. 
Q. Do you know~ 
A. Well, I know that we endeavor to give the 
Magna-Garfield a good share of our business, of 
the normal business, you might say. 
Q. Then you are representing to this Com-
mission that this contract really only becomes 
operative in these emergency periods; is that 
correct~ 
A. In general. 
Q. Why do you qualify it, in general~ Why 
that expression? 
A. \Vell, as I just said, something might come 
up after lunch, and the man wants his sugar 
delivered to him that day. 
Q. So, it is pretty much of a practice through-
out the year, isn't it~ '" 
A. To the extent it could happen almost any 
time. 
Q. So, this isn't an emergency at all. It is 
a continuous process you contemplate~ 
* * *- * * 
A. I have endeavored to show these things 
happen on a little unusual circumstance, and, in 
general, as I keep saying, we give the :Magna-
Garfield a steady flow of business when they can 
give us the service we require. But if some occa-
sion has brought about necessity for quick service 
from West Jordan within the hour, then we give 
the business to the Salt Lake Transfer Company. 
Q. Well, now, with this new contract, if it is 
approved by the Commission and a permit issued, 
you are going to give the Salt Lake Transfer all 
the business, aren't you~ 
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~\. ~o, that i~ not tnw. \\'e would ~till givP 
the :Jlagna-Garfielrl the bm~inP~~ on whieh then• 
i~ no emergt>ney fur quirk rlelin•ry. 
Q. Trcll . . lJOII hare no critici,-.·,n of tl/(' lu111dliJI/f 
of the shipments by Jfa.tnw (( Garfield, tlwt yo1t 
hare giren to them! 
A. Xo; it has been l'CJ)f satisfactory. 
Q. r ou hare no criticism of its automoti·ve 
equipment it uses in that respect? 
~\. Xo. 
Q. Your whole contention i~:, then, .Mr. 
~\nsell, that the common carrier here involved 
cannot render this emergency, is that the theory, 
which emergency service is brought about b)' 
comparatiYe conditions~ 
A. That's right, cannot render a speedy 
service, would probably be a better word than 
'emergency'. 
* 
Q. And . the handling of sugar does not re-
quire any particular type of automotive equip-
ment, does it~ 
A. X o, except it has. got to be kept fron1 the 
weather, of course. • 
Q. Of course. And you have no co1nplaint of 
the equipment of the Magna-Garfield on lhat 
score1 
A. I do not." (Italics supplied) {R. 104, 105, 
106, 197) 
Therefore, plaintiffs' own evidence establishPs lw-
yond peradventure that the defendant cmTIPr has ren-
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dered to the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company a service which 
has been free from criticism, and which has been very 
satisfactory. Furthermore, Mr. Ansell admits that the 
Sugar Company has no complaint as to the type of 
equipment used by the defendant carrier. It is weather 
proof equipment. It is obvious from Mr. Ansell's testi-
mony that the Sugar Company supported plaintiffs' ap-
plication on the single basis that it could obtain fro:n 
the ,applicants a speedier service. The issue therefore 
becomes a narrow one, and that is whether the defendant 
carrier proved that it can render this speedier service. 
The evidence on behalf of the defendant carrier definitely 
proves that it has both the equipment and the personnel 
to render this speedier service. The President of the 
defendant carrier denied the assertion that his com-
pany was not able to render the Sugar Company the 
service required by it. (R. 144, 145, 151) He described 
at length the equipment maintained and operated by the 
defendant carrier. The company maintains a regular 
schedule to Bingham and Garfield. ·( R. 142) The regu-
larly scheduled trucks leave Salt Lake at 10:00 A.M. 
each week-day morning, but his company is prepared to 
furnish other and additional trucks in any emergency. 
(R. 153) Three trucks are operated on the Sah Luk.. 
Bingham route, and one on the Salt Lake-Garfield route. 
(R. 153) The Company owns eight trucks at presen , 
and employs six drivers, but it has available sources to 
secure other automotive equipment, upon immediate de-
mand, and has available two emergency drivers. (R. 142, 
143) In the knowledge of the President there was only 
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one instmwe of the defendant earrirr '8 failure to comply 
with the Sugar Company's request, and that wn~ a de-
mand late in the afternoon for a delivery within a half 
hour from the call. The President explained to the Sugar 
Company that he could not meet the demand for a de-
liYel'Y within the half hour, but was prepared to make it 
within two hours. (R. 144) X o employee of the defendant 
carrier is authorized to refuse any shipments. (R. 157, 
158) The haulage of sugar from the \Vest Jordan fac-
. . 
tory is on the Salt Lake-Bingham operation of defend-
ant carrier. (R. 152) On the return trip from Bingham 
these trucks are author,ized to n1ake "pickups" at inter-
mediate points. (R. 156) _ The back haul is very snmll, 
and a stop at the West Jordan factory to pick up a 
shipment would be entirely pos~ible. (R. 156) If the 
Suga_r Company requires full truck loads to be moved, 
the defendant carrier is prepared, upon notification, to 
provide such truck equipment. (R. 151) The defendant 
carrier is prepared at all times to render the Sugar Conl-· 
pany the quick deliveries of large quantities of sugar to 
Salt Lake City. (R. 145) Specifically, the President of de-
fendant company denied the testimony of the Sugar 
Company witness that the defendant carrier had not 
been able to render the service required by the Sugar 
Company, in view of competitive conditions in Salt Lake 
City. (R. 145) He asserted that his company was able 
and willing to handle the same quantities of sugar as 
have been handled by the applicants, and to render the 
transportation :-;prvice with the same speed and e:fficienr:-
as the applicants. (R. 145) 
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It is not the task of the Supreme Court to weigh 
evidence or resolve conflicts in evidence. Its function 
in reviewing cases of this type is to determine whether 
there was substantial eidence before the Commission to 
support its findings. Conflicts in the evidence as to 
whether the defendant carrier was ready, willing and 
able to render the so-called speedier service were for 
. the Commission alone to resolve. By its findings the 
Commission resolved this issue against the plaintiffs. 
At this hearing there was no issue concerning the bur-
dening of the West Jordan-Salt Lake highway, or of 
undue interference with the traveling public. The evi-
dence was directed solely to the question whether the 
granting of the application would be detrimental to the 
best interests of the State of Utah and/or to the locali-
ties to be served, and as to whether the existing trans-
portation facilities provide adequate and reasonable 
service. There was substantial evidence before the Com-
mission from which it could reasonably find that the 
transportation facilities offered by the defendant car-
rier were and would be adequate and reasonable, even 
considering the extraordinary demand of the Sugar 
Company for ''speedier service.'' The evidence also 
justified the Commission in reaching the conclusion that 
public interest would be damaged if it granted the re-
quested permit. In this connection the quotation from . 
People's Transit Company v. Henshaw (8 Cir., 20 Fed. 
2d 87 at p. 90) quoted in the McCarthy opinion, supra, 
is appropriate: 
''The results of such .competition, where there 
is not sufficient business to sustain all of the 
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co1npetitors, i~ that a ~l·a::-;on of experieneP en u~e8 
all or some to drop out or eompeb tlw pnrehn~t' 
of competitors (usually at exaggerated amounts), 
thus eansing an increase of capital Pxpenditure 
of the purchasers upon which the chargPH to tlw 
public must be based and thereby inerPn~P<l. 
· • These considerations, and others, amply 
ju::'tify differences to protect and pre~Pl'\'P thi• 
existing pennanent s.Ystem. )J" o ne\v sy~tem lw~ 
a legal right to destroy such existing systen1 and 
haYe the public at its mercy. The public welfare 
is not serYed, but harn1ed thereby. The public 
may protect itself against such results. Nor can 
·any theory of free competition change this situa-
tion. Competition is recognized and encouraged 
for the sole reason that it is supposed to result 
in the public good. But competition is not neces-
sarily unrestrainable. It cannot be allowed to 
harm the very public it was designed to protect 
and aid. It may be restrained for the public wel-
fare just the same as monopoly may be restrained 
or as competition maY be left unrestrained. The 
test in each instance is the public good. Where 
the restraint upon competition is for the public 
good, it is sustainable just as restraint upon 
freedom of action by the individual is valid where 
tor the public good. Such is the basis of and the 
reason for the entire police power.'' 
1. It will he detrimental to the best interests of 
the public and to the localities served, to grant 
the permit' to plaintiffs. 
The decision in the instant case may in a general 
manner set a precedent with respect to motor vehicle 
transportation in the State· of Utah, and far-reaching 
consequences may result therefrom. The problem pre-
sented to the Commission was an exceedingly important 
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one, not only to the plaintiffs, the defendant car-
rier of Utah-Idaho Sugar Company but also to 
the public at large. There is fundamentally in-
volved the responsibility of the Public Service Com-
mission with respect to its administration of the act 
governing transportation by motor vehicles. One of the 
principal purposes of the act is to insure that the public 
will secure an efficient permanent transportation service, 
whether that service be rendered by common or contract 
carriers. It is the duty of the Commission to administer 
the law with wisdom and foresight, to the end that the 
public may be best served. The spirit of the act envisions 
a state-wide transportation system composed of numer-
ous units, be they either common or contract carriers, 
who are financially respons: ble and are ready, willing 
and able to furnish to the public the service that it de-
serves and requires. While neither certificates of con-
venience and necessity nor contract carrier permits 
grant any monopoly, and certainly do not vest in the 
recipients thereof any right to be free from competition 
or to hold a monopoly against the public, there exist:5 
intrinsically in the regulatory provisions of the statute 
the purpose and intention of the legislature to rrevent 
uncontrolled competition between motor carriers of such 
nature as would eventually either seriously impair trans-
portation facilities or perhaps ·utterly destroy them. By 
vesting in the Commission a ·corrtrolled··<;Iiscretion· as ~to 
either' grantirig· or withholding certificates: and· permits, 
dep~ndent upon -circumstances, .the -legislature Pvinced 
its .intention ·that motor vehiele tran~portation should 
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be_so regulated as to prevent the evils of a monopoly on 
the one hand and the destructive influence of uncontrolled 
competition on the other~ It is by striking· a happy nH.'·· 
dium between th~ two extremes that .the Con1missio11 
achieYes the purpose of the law. An administrative 
body like the Commission is best qualified to weigh ,and 
measure the fact:5 and circu1nstances of a giYen case, in 
order to strike this balance. 
It would be lawful for the Commission, under facts 
and circun1stances which control the exercise of its dis-
cretion, to issue a contract carrier permit over the iden-
tical route of, and in competition with a previously auth-
orized common carrier. The law did not intend that a 
common carrier holding a Certificate should have, for 
all time,· a monopoly on the transportation over the 
route served by it, but this is not- necessarily justifica-
tion. for licensing competing carriers where there is no 
public interest involved. The Supreme Court in its de~ 
cision ~.the case of Utah Light & Traction Company 'V. 
Public Service Commission of Utah,· (101 Ut. 99; 118 
Pac. 2d 683 at 690) stated : 
'' * * * but when a territory is satisfactorily 
serviced and its transportation facilities.are ample, 
a duplication of such. service, which unfairly inter-
feres· witp existing carriers may undermine and 
weaken the transportation setup generally' and 
thus deprive the public ofan effiC-ient; permanent 
.s.ervice.' '__ -' .... 
The defendant -cari~ier is the- 6\\rner~·and liolder of .:a 
Certificate of Convenience an<r Nec~s~ity -1ssu:ed hy th{} 
Pnblic SPrvice Commission, atithorizin·g it to carry on 
4'5·: 
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the business of a common carrier between Salt Lake 
City and Bingham, Utah, over the highways stated in 
said Certificate. The West Jordan factory of the Sugar 
Company is served by this common carrier route. There 
is a public necessity existing for the maintenance of a 
motor vehicle common carrier operation between Salt 
Lake and Bingham. At the latter point is. conducted on~_, 
of the most important industries in the State of etah, 
and the service of that community by an efficient, finan-
cially responsible common motor carrier is of great im-
portance, not only to Bingham and Salt Lake City, bnt 
also to the public at large. While Bingham is served by 
common carriers by rail, operations of the defendant 
carrier over a long period of time have proved the far-t 
that there does exist a necessity and demand for motor 
Yehicle carrier servicr. The Commission, by granting 
the Certificate to the defendant carrier, has in effect 
found ·such fact. The maintenance of such service in an 
efficient manner, is of course dependent primarily upon 
the financial returns received by the defendant carrier, 
and these returns are dependent upon the volume of 
business arising not only in Salt Lake City and Bing-
ham, but also along its route. The business of the Sugar 
Company in the movement of sugar to Salt Lake City 
from its West Jordan factory is a legitimate contribu-
tion to the financial welfare of defendant carrier. Prinla 
facie this business belongs to the common carriers which 
serve the factory, provided, of course, that their service 
is adequate. The defendant carrier is ready, willing and 
able to furnish the service to the Sugar Company which 
46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
will meet its dernands and requirements, resultant upon 
the highly con1petitive conditions revealed by the evi-
dence. The testimony of the Sugar Company witness in 
its fullest thrust serves only to establish the fact that 
should this permit be gTanted, the Sugar Company will 
be given additional choice of carriers. But this fact 
does not establish the ultimate fact which must be found 
by the Commission, viz: that it will not be detrimental 
to the best interests of the people and of the localities 
to be served if such permit is granted. It is ~igorously 
urged by the defendants that there is no basis in fact to 
justify· the Commission in introducing competition in 
the hauling of sugar between West Jordan and Salt 
Lake City as against the defendant carrier. The result 
of granting such permit would only be to subtract frorn 
the defendant carrier a certain volume of business in 
order to give the Sugar Company a further choice of 
carriers. The granting of the permit might very well 
establish a pattern for the Commission in similar cases 
which are sure to arise. Let there be a certain number 
of incidents, destructive compet.ition between carirers 
will be encouraged rather than restrained as contern-
plated by the law. The mere convenience of one shipper 
along a common carrier route is not sufficient reason 
to justify the Commission in introducing competition 
against its previously licensed common carrier where 
there is no evidence that the public at large will benefit 
from the same. 
The crux of the plaintiffs' case is simply this: The 
Sugar Company encounters vigorous competition trom 
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other sugar companies which maintain large stocks oi 
sugar in Salt Lake City, and it seeks to meet this compe-
tition by securing from the plaintiffs a transportatiOn 
service which the evidence fails to prove as being neces-
sary, but which simply serves the convenience of the 
Sugar Company. It is the contention of defendants that 
such evidence utterly fails to support a finding that the 
granting of the application would not be detrimental to 
the best interests of the- peopl eand of the localities 
~en·ed. If the mere convenience of one shipper on de-
fendant carrier's route is reason for the Commission 
introducing competition against it, like convenience of 
other shippers, multiplied several times, may easily 
destroy defendant carrier's business. This is the exact 
t~·pe of competition \Yhieh the statute intended the Com-
mission to control or rPstrict. Let it be supposed that 
other (fWners of motor Yehicles apply to the Commission 
for contract carrier permits over defendant carrier's 
route, and base their applications upon asserted conven-
Ience of certain other shippers. What will then be the 
attitude of the Commission when it is faced with the 
problem of either serving the convenience of the shippers 
or weakening the ability of the defendant carrier to per-
form its public service? The time to stop such process 
is at the present. The public good can be best served 
by sustaining defendant carrier in its common carrier 
operation over the route involved. 
2. Existing transportation facilities operated by 
defendant carrier provide adequate and reason-
able service over its route. 
The Commission, in order to justify the issuance of 
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a permit to plaintiffs, must also find that existing trans-
portation facilities over the Salt Lake-Bingham route do 
not provide adequate or reasonable s~rvice. The evi-
dence in this case does not even suggest that the defendant 
carrier has failed in any respect in the performance of 
its duties as common carrier over the route involved. 
:No complaint has been registered against defendent car-
rier for its failure to serve the public. The Sugar Cont-
pany witness at the hearing frankly stated that the basis 
of the application was solely a question of speedier 
rather than emergency service. In other words, there 
was a true admission by this witness that defendant 
carrier is ready, willing and able to render even the so-
called emergency service to the Sugar Company. Ap-
parently the only criticism which the Sugar Company 
could make against defendant carrier's service was the 
question of time. There is not a scintilla of evidence in 
the record that defendant carrier does not possess ade-
quate automotive equipment nor the necessary personnel 
to operate the equipment. The testimony of the Presi--
dent of the defendant carrier, assuring the Commission 
of the ability of his company to perform its functions 
as common carrier, stands uncontradicted, and even the 
Sugar Company witness did not dispute this statement. 
The defendant carrier admitted frankly that there had 
been one occasion when the Sugar Company requested 
a movement of sugar within a half hour's time, and due to 
circumstances then prevailing the carrier requested 
two hours' time. The ability of the defendant carrier to 
Rerve the public and also to serve the Sugar Company 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rnust stand a~ a definite fact in this case. The President 
of the defendant earrier declared that his company was 
in a pnf-'i tion, upon demaiHl of the Sugar Company, to 
di:..;patch extra trucks in order to effPd this "speedy" 
delivery of sugar into Salt Lake. It is impossible, there-
fa rP, to torture from this evidence a finding that exist-
ing transportation facilities, as furnished by defendant 
en ITier, do not provide adequate or reasonable service 
for the shippers along its route, be they the public in 
general or the Sugar Company in particular. There is 
no particular conflict of evidence in this case, when it is 
<'arefully analyzed and considered. Unless the Commis-
sion could find that defendant carrier's transportation 
facilities now and in the future do not provide adequate 
and reasonable service, it is not authorized_ to grant the 
plaintiffs' application. 
The defendants earnestly submit to the Court that 
the Commission committed no error in denying plain-
tiffs' application for a contract carrier permit to serve 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company from its West Jordan 
Plant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Magna-Garfield Truck Line 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of Utah 
_MARK K. BOYLE 
Assistant Attorney Ge11eral 
Attorneys for Public Sere-ice 
Commission of Utah 
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